Psychological Science

Visual working memory (vWM) is often linked to conscious experience and visual imagery, but it is typically described as a system that stores separate, independent items. These assumptions are difficult to reconcile, given the unified nature of conscious experience. Here, we test the hypothesis that vWM relies on at least two distinct representations: an underlying, unconscious memory trace and a consciously accessible, integrated representation. A total of 216 participants performed a change-detection task, in which they rated their perceptual awareness of the memory display during the maintenance interval. Critically, we manipulated the statistical properties of the displays (average item size and size variability) to probe sensitivity to unified ensemble-level structure. Results revealed a dissociation between subjective and objective measures. Perceptual awareness increased for displays with larger, more variable items, whereas objective performance improved for displays with smaller, less variable items. Despite this difference, subjective awareness still predicted performance, and even incorrect responses showed consistent biases rather than random guesses. Importantly, individual differences in imagery vividness (VVIQ) were selectively associated with subjective awareness and estimation bias, but not with objective correctness. These precision biases were further shaped by display statistics, suggesting that multiple representations can guide behavior. Together, our findings support a reinterpretation of vWM performance in which task responses can draw on both unconscious and consciously accessible representations. One possible explanation for these behavioral patterns is that subjective experience reflects integrated, ensemble-like representations, while objective performance depends more strongly on item-specific information. Public significance statementsWorking memory allows us to temporarily hold and use information, and differences in this ability are closely linked to broader cognitive skills such as intelligence. This study shows that these differences may not depend only on how much information people can store, but also on how they experience it: some individuals appear to rely more on consciously accessible, image-like representations, especially when memory is uncertain or prone to error. By demonstrating that subjective experience and the vividness of imagery can shape behavior independently of objective accuracy, these findings suggest that how we use memory may be as important as how much we can store, with implications for understanding individual differences in cognition.

Pretend play is a hallmark behavior in childhood where children create nonliteral meanings. Empirical data supporting the role of social cognition and the decoupling from literality are still scarce during early development. We explored here how the comprehension of pretense affects the visual exploratory behavior of toddlers (n = 44) and adults (n = 65) when they were exposed to short video clips in which an actress performed either real actions (e.g., eating jelly) or pretend actions (e.g., pretending to eat with imaginary food), while varying the complexity of those actions. We analyzed participants exploration of the face in the videos as exploitation of social information. We showed that all observers paid more attention to the face in pretend scenarios than in real ones, measured as longer total looking time in adults and more fixations and revisits to the face in both age groups. We also found more gaze shifts (a measure of information sampling) between the face and the moving hand in the pretend videos in both age groups, mainly at the initial stages of the actions. Additionally, analyses of the scanpaths structure using gaze entropy showed less order in the exploration of pretend videos in both age groups, suggesting that pretense involved greater uncertainty and increased information seeking. The less structured trajectories were observed again mainly in complex pretend scenarios. Taken together, our gaze results indicate that from its developmental origins, the comprehension of pretense relies on social processes linked with information seeking and exploration. Significance StatementDevelopmental theories have long debated whether pretend games are born in conjunction with social capacities in the second year or become integrated later in life. Our study shows that, much like adults, toddlers visually explore pretend scenes gathering more social information and in a less structured manner compared to real-world scenarios, suggesting that the emerging capacity to play with the meaning of things is linked with that of thinking of other minds early in life.

The most highly predictive polygenic scores in the behavioural sciences are for cognitive traits, especially general cognitive ability (g) and educational attainment. We combined polygenic scores derived from genome-wide association studies of adult g and educational attainment to create adult 'polygenic g scores' which we used to chart the course of cognitive development of 10,000 white British children from toddlerhood through early adulthood. We integrated cross-sectional regression, latent growth curve, and confirmatory factor analysis to systematically characterise cognitive development. Polygenic g score showed minimal prediction in toddlerhood, modest prediction in childhood, and substantial prediction by early adulthood accounting for 12% of the variance. Higher polygenic g scores were associated with faster cognitive growth in latent growth models. Prediction was strongest for a cross-time latent cognitive factor (15%) capturing cognitive ability across development. By integrating polygenic prediction directly into a structural equation model framework, we provided a theoretical upper bound of genetic influences on g under minimal measurement error. We also examined the polygenic g score's prediction of educational achievement, behaviour problems, and anthropometric outcomes and found similar developmental increases in prediction for educational achievement. Together, our findings demonstrate that adult polygenic g scores can be a useful tool for charting the development of cognitive traits.

Each individual person looks at natural scenes in their own unique way, resulting in a distinct perceptual experience of the world. However, little is known about why such differences in gaze emerge. Here, we test the hypothesis that idiosyncrasies in gaze behavior are predicted by inter-subject variations in internal models--expectations about how scenes typically look. In two experiments, we first characterized participants personal internal models by asking them to draw typical bathroom and kitchen scenes. Individual differences in these drawings were quantified using an objective deep learning pipeline and, in turn, related to individual differences in gaze behavior. In Experiment 1, where participants freely viewed a set of kitchen and bathroom photographs, inter-subject similarities in internal models did not predict inter-subject similarities in gaze. In Experiment 2, we encouraged strategic exploration through gaze-contingent viewing and a memory task. Here, inter-subject similarities in internal models predicted similarities in fixation frequency and the sequence in which different object categories were inspected. These findings suggest that the influence of internal models on visual exploration is stronger under increased sensory uncertainty and when expectation-guided sampling of the environment is encouraged. Together, our results provide new insights into how individual expectations shape gaze behavior and help explain why people differ in how they explore the visual world.

The ability to evaluate ones own knowledge states is often studied using paradigms in which participants make a decision and subsequently report their confidence. This structure has motivated hierarchical models in which confidence arises from a metacognitive process, distinct from the decision process itself, that estimates the probability that the choice is correct (Meyniel et al., 2015; Pouget et al., 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017). Here, we contrast this framework with an alternative based on an intentional architecture (Shadlen et al., 2008). In this account, choice and confidence are determined simultaneously through a multidimensional drift-diffusion process, where each dimension represents one choice-confidence combination (Ratcliff and Starns, 2009, 2013). Choice, response time, and confidence jointly emerge when one of these accumulators reaches a decision bound. To adjudicate between these accounts, we fit both models to behavioral data from two perceptual tasks: a random-dots motion discrimination task with incentivized confidence reports, and a luminance discrimination task without feedback or incentives. The integrated model provided a superior fit for the incentivized motion task, whereas the hierarchical model more accurately captured behavior in the un-incentivized luminance task. These results suggest that confidence does not rely on a single computational mechanism, but rather its implementation may adapt to the specific demands and structure of the task.

Confidence judgments play a critical role in guiding behavior by shaping information-seeking, learning, and decision strategies. These functions are most effective when confidence is well calibrated, that is, when subjective uncertainty aligns with the objective uncertainty in the presented evidence. Motivated by this, we investigated how people form confidence judgments from noisy samples of information, and whether they use statistically grounded strategies or rely on heuristics. Participants performed two categorization tasks, one with visual orientation stimuli and one with number stimuli. In each task, participants saw sequentially presented observations and made a decision about the generating category and simultaneously reported their confidence in that decision. We independently manipulated the number of observations and standard deviation of the sample to assess whether confidence reflected an integrated estimate of both sources of statistical uncertainty. Behaviorally, confidence and accuracy both increased with larger sample sizes and lower variability. Furthermore, confidence and accuracy were equivalent in samples matched for standard error, suggesting that participants relied on a statistically grounded strategy. Computational modeling further supported this interpretation: a model that scaled confidence according to the standard error of the sample mean provided the best fit to the data, outperforming more heuristic and Bayesian alternatives. This pattern generalized across the orientation and number tasks, suggesting a domain-general strategy for uncertainty estimation. Together, these findings demonstrate that people use structured, statistically grounded strategies to compute their confidence, supporting well-calibrated decision-making even in the absence of full Bayesian inference.

Some images are consistently remembered better than others, suggesting that memorability reflects intrinsic image properties. We tested whether within-category distinctiveness underlies this effect. Across three experiments (N = 477), participants categorized indoor scenes previously rated for subjective typicality and then completed recognition memory tests. Typical scenes were categorized faster and more accurately, but were remembered worse and showed a more liberal response bias than atypical scenes. These opposing effects were robust across categories. To link subjective typicality to visual representations, we quantified image distinctiveness using a convolutional neural network (CNN). Across layers, CNN-derived distinctiveness closely tracked human typicality judgments and predicted both categorization speed and memorability, with strongest effects in higher, semantic layers. Critically, the memory advantage for atypical scenes persisted even when most images were atypical, ruling out rarity within the experimental context. Together, the results show that intrinsic scene memorability reflects an images position within a category-specific representational space.

Color is a prominent feature of visual experience, yet humans can recognize objects easily and accurately from grayscale images. We examined whether color becomes more useful when spatial information is degraded due to blurring. Participants viewed naturalistic scenes in color or grayscale, and reported whether a named target object was present across a range of blur levels that simulated optical defocus from 0-8 diopters. With unblurred images, performance did not differ between color and grayscale conditions, but as blur increased, recognition accuracy declined. Color provided a modest but reliable advantage at higher levels of blur, suggesting that color becomes increasingly useful when optical quality is degraded. We hypothesize that the evolutionary shift towards trichromacy may have been partially driven by the need to compensate for optical degradation due to aging and/or accumulated light exposure.

Wellbeing is commonly defined as the combination of feeling good and functioning well and typically conceptualized as two related but distinct components. Hedonic wellbeing emphasizes pleasure, happiness, and life satisfaction, while eudaimonic wellbeing focuses on meaning, personal growth, flourishing, and the realization of ones potential. The Mental Health Continuum-Short Form was developed as a comprehensive measure of wellbeing and includes three subscales assessing emotional, social, and psychological wellbeing. Although the Mental Health Continuum total score is often interpreted as an indicator of overall wellbeing, the underlying genetic structure of its three subscales and its genetic overlap with other commonly used wellbeing measures remains unclear. Using data from 5,212 individuals from the Netherlands Twin Register (72% female, mean age 36.4), we fitted multivariate twin models to examine the genetic architecture of the Mental Health Continuum and its associations with other wellbeing measures (quality of life, life satisfaction, subjective happiness, and flourishing). Results indicate that, at the genetic level, the Mental Health Continuum is best explained by its three distinct subscales rather than by a latent factor. When considering the Mental Health Continuum together with the other wellbeing measures, we found moderate to high genetic correlations (r = 0.52 - 0.83), indicating substantial overlap in the genetics underlying the wellbeing constructs. However, we did not find evidence for a single common genetic factor underlying all constructs. These findings highlight the multidimensional structure of wellbeing, but the moderate to high genetic correlations across measures suggest that it is important to align the level of measurement (phenotypic vs genetic) with the research question.

Population fertility patterns are closely linked to socioeconomic inequality, with educational attainment (EA) being a key predictor of completed fertility. While EA is partially heritable, the extent to which EA-associated genetic variation relates to fertility independently of education remains unclear, particularly outside Western European and North American populations. Using data from [~]40,000 women and [~]10,000 men in the Estonian Biobank, we examine sex-specific associations between EA polygenic scores (PGSEA) and completed fertility. We extend prior work by distinguishing cognitive and non-cognitive EA components, accounting for age at first pregnancy (AFP), and applying within-family analyses to assess the role of direct genetic effects. Among women, PGSEA is negatively associated with fertility, with a significantly stronger association for the non-cognitive than the cognitive EA polygenic score. The association between PGSEAand fertility is moderated by EA and changes sign across AFP strata, from negative among women with earlier AFP to positive among those with later AFP. Importantly, this association is not attenuated in within-family models, consistent with a predominant role of direct genetic effects. Among men, associations are weak or slightly positive and stable across education groups. Overall, EA-related genetic variation is associated with fertility through pathways that appear largely independent of educational attainment, suggesting that shared genetic influences operate through multiple mechanisms that differ by sex and reproductive timing. SignificanceEducational attainment is closely linked to completed fertility, yet the mechanisms behind this relationship remain not fully understood. Using a population-based cohort from Estonia, we show that genetic variants associated with education relate to fertility in markedly different ways for women and men and that these associations cannot be explained by education level alone. Differences between cognitive and non-cognitive education-related genetic components further point to multiple life-course pathways linking genetics and reproduction. Family-based analyses suggest that these associations are largely consistent with direct genetic effects and not driven by correlated family environments. Together, our findings suggest that education-related genetic variation shapes fertility through multiple sex-specific and life-course-dependent pathways, rather than acting solely through educational attainment.

Stored memories are useless unless they are available for retrieval. Thus, investigating different ways to modulate retrieval is crucial. Novelty has been extensively studied as a modulator of memory. In this study, we investigated whether exposure to a novel event, an innovative neuroscience lesson, can enhance memory retrieval and divergent thinking in high school students. Across three experiments, we assessed the timing and mechanisms underlying these effects. In experiment 1, we found that memory retrieval was enhanced when the novel lesson occurred immediately before a memory test, but not when it was presented one hour earlier. In experiment 2, we found that the same immediate novelty exposure improved divergent thinking performance. Finally, in experiment 3, we explored potential shared mechanisms using a competition protocol and revealed that novelty improved divergent thinking regardless of its timing relative to memory retrieval. However, memory retrieval benefited only when tested immediately before the divergent thinking task. These results suggest that novelty boosts both memory retrieval and divergent thinking, but through partially distinct mechanisms. Our findings demonstrate that a simple, real-world classroom intervention can effectively enhance key cognitive functions in students. Significance StatementStored memories are only valuable if they can be retrieved, and memory retrieval plays a key role in creative thinking. Here, we tested whether a simple, novel event, a neuroscience lesson, could enhance memory retrieval and creative thinking in a real-world classroom setting. We found that novelty improved both memory retrieval and divergent thinking, an aspect of creative thinking, when presented immediately before the task. Finally, we revealed a non-reciprocal competition effect between memory retrieval and divergent thinking. These findings highlight a practical, low-cost intervention to boost key cognitive functions in students, demonstrating that brief, well-timed novel experiences can support both learning and creative thinking in educational environments.

Confirmation bias impacts judgments and decisions across a range of domains including finance, policy and science. Here we examine whether explicitly labelling information as true or false disrupts a core underlying computational mechanism that can generate this pervasive bias - asymmetric learning. Human participants (Study 1: N=47; Study 2: N=57) completed a 2 alternative forced choice (2AFC) task previously used to test for the presence of confirmation bias. Participants made choices between pairs of options that could win or lose money and received either factual or counterfactual feedback after each choice. We introduced a key novel feature into the task - providing explicit cues that signalled to participants whether feedback they had seen was true (verified) or false (debunked). Learning in response to feedback was attenuated under false compared to true labels but was present under both. Fitting participants choices to computational models enabled us to examine how sensitivity to the feedback varied as a function of both the label (true/false) and confirmation (confirmatory/disconfirmatory). This revealed a distinct pattern of learning rates typical of confirmation bias (enhanced learning from positive prediction errors for chosen options and from negative prediction errors for unchosen options) in response to both true and false labels. The findings highlight how confirmation bias plays an important role in the effectiveness of interventions designed to verify true and/or debunk false claims. Verification is less likely to succeed when information disconfirms prior beliefs. Conversely, debunking false claims is unlikely to succeed when the information confirms ones prior beliefs.

Children frequently intervene in social conflicts by punishing violators or helping victims, yet the motivational mechanisms underlying such third-party altruistic behavior remain poorly understood. It remains unclear how children balance fairness concerns against self-interest, how these motivations interact with intervention costs and impact on outcomes, and whether gender and individual differences reflect distinct motivational structures. Here, we applied the motive cocktail model, which assumes that altruistic behavior arises from multiple prosocial motives, to dissociate motivations underlying third-party interventions. We studied 229 children aged 8-12 years (123 boys), an age when fairness and inequality aversion are reliably expressed. The third-party intervention task manipulated inequality between others, the personal cost of intervention, its impact on outcomes, and the form of intervention (punishment versus helping). Children intervened more as inequality increased and less as intervention costs rose, indicating a trade-off between moral benefits and self-interest. Gender differences emerged only under high-cost and high-impact conditions, with boys engaging in more punishment interventions. The motive cocktail model outperformed alternative models and revealed that boys showed stronger aversion to disadvantageous inequality and a greater tendency to reverse victims disadvantage than girls. Clustering analyses further identified distinct motivational profiles within each gender. These findings demonstrate that childrens third-party altruistic behavior is governed by multiple dissociable motives. This study provides a mechanistic account of how social motivations are organized and weighted during late childhood.

People often switch tasks when attention wanes or an alternative task becomes more appealing. Such choices may reflect different control modes that may vary with working memory (WM) capacity. This study tested whether momentary attentional lapses prospectively predict voluntarily task switching and whether this relationship depends on WM capacity. Participants performed a continuous performance task involving face and scene images, with blocks in which they either freely chose the next task or followed an externally imposed sequence. A clear capacity-dependent crossover emerged where individuals with lower capacity were more likely to switch following lapse-prone blocks, whereas higher-capacity individuals tended to switch from relatively well-focused states. Eye-tracking revealed greater bias toward the competing irrelevant category before switches in lower-capacity individuals, accompanied by early conflict-related pupil dilation. Externally imposed task sequencing selectively reduced lapses in the lower-capacity group without affecting higher-capacity performance, suggesting that external structure can scaffold weaker internal goal maintenance. These findings suggest that the relationship between lapses and voluntary switching varies with WM capacity rather than being uniform across individuals. This pattern is consistent with a goal-competition account in which lapses reflect shifts in the balance between competing task goals, and voluntary switches may be preceded by different control states.

Goal-directed behavior often requires sustained effort across a sequence of interdependent decisions, yet the determinants of persistence in such contexts remain poorly understood. Here, we investigated how individuals regulate persistence in a novel sequential effort-based task in which they controlled an avatar through successive checkpoints to reach a final goal and could make repeated attempts following failure. At each attempt, participants could choose either to persist in the same task or to disengage toward an easier but less rewarding alternative. We found that decisions to persist or disengage were jointly shaped by multiple interacting factors. Disengagement increased with task difficulty and lower skill level. It also increased with repeated attempts and time-on-task, indexing fatigue, and with accumulated errors, indexing lack of progress. Conversely, proximity to the goal promoted persistence and shaped decision dynamics by reducing choice conflict during persistence decisions and increasing hesitation during disengagement near the goal. Notably, clearing the first checkpoint produced a sharp increase in persistence, suggesting that early success plays a pivotal role. Furthermore, persistence reflected both retrospective and prospective evaluations of effort, with prior investment promoting commitment and anticipated effort reducing it. Finally, disengagement was preceded by short-term performance decline but not by gradual increases in decision conflict, suggesting relatively abrupt strategy shifts following repeated failures. Together, these findings provide a comprehensive account of persistence in sequential effortful tasks, showing that decisions to persist or disengage are jointly shaped by multiple factors related to fatigue, (lack of) progress, goal proximity, and early success.

Genetic variation contributes to individual differences in food liking and dietary behaviour. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have identified genetic variants associated with these traits, but most evidence comes from middle-aged and older populations. Young adulthood is a key life stage during which long-term dietary habits develop, yet the genetic basis of food liking during this period remains largely unexplored. We conducted GWAS of 97 food liking traits and two derived principal components (PCs) in 2,784 young adults (age 25) from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children. The PCs captured broader food preference patterns reflecting preferences for diverse plant-based and seafood foods (PC1) and meat-based foods (PC2). GWAS identified 32 genome-wide significant associations across 24 traits. Cross-trait analyses indicated that several variants influenced liking across groups of related foods. For example, the lentil-associated variant rs76659918 showed associations with multiple foods, including honey, plain yogurt, chilli peppers, aubergines, avocado, and black olives, as well as PC1, whereas variants associated with bacon, burgers, and steak were linked to multiple meat-based foods and PC2. Exploratory analyses showed that TAS2R38 bitter-sensitive alleles were associated with lower liking for Brussels sprouts, with limited evidence for associations with other traits. Comparison with GWAS of food liking in the UK Biobank cohort (age 37-73) showed limited replication, with robust evidence only for the grapefruit-associated locus. This study identifies genetic variants associated with food liking in young adulthood and suggests that genetic influences operate at both the level of individual foods and broader food preference patterns.

Memory generalization allows individuals to extract and apply information from prior experiences to novel situations, supporting flexible learning and efficient decision-making. Theoretical models suggest that sleep should facilitate generalization, yet the literature examining its role in promoting generalization is mixed. We recruited 137 participants via Prolific to complete an image-location memory task over two sessions spaced 12 hours apart. Participants were randomly assigned to the Wake group (learning in the morning) or the Sleep group (learning in the evening). In Session 1, participants learned the location of stimuli on the screen and were tested on their memory five minutes later. Twelve hours later, in Session 2, they were tested on their memory again. Stimuli consisted of 160 images from eight semantic categories and were strategically positioned on-screen to test the effects of generalization on retrieval (i.e., category-based memory distortions and biases). After the delay, retrieval was less accurate and demonstrated more generalization. However, these effects were mostly independent of Group, with some evidence for enhanced generalization following a period of wakefulness over sleep. Generalization was also driven by time of day, with more generalization in the evening relative to the morning. Taken together, our results, based on a large online sample, do not support a role for sleep in promoting memory generalization. Significance StatementBehavior is often guided by memories of previous experiences. However, for behavior to be adaptive and flexible (e.g., when encountering never-before-seen stimuli), regularities about the world must be extracted from these memories. This process, termed memory generalization, has been hypothesized to rely on sleep. We used a large online sample to test sleeps role in generalization and found no support for this hypothesis. Our results suggest that sleep and wakefulness contribute to generalization equally, with the latter potentially having a larger contribution.

Decisions based on evidence accumulated over time require rules governing when to end the accumulation process and commit to a choice. These rules control inherent trade-offs between decision speed and accuracy, which require careful balance to maximize quantities that depend on both like reward rate. We previously showed that, to maximize reward rate, normative decision rules adapt to changing task conditions (Barendregt et al., 2022). Here we used a novel task to examine whether and how people use adaptive rules for individual decisions under a variety of conditions, including changes in decision outcomes across trials and changes in evidence quality both across and within trials. We found that the participants tended to use rules that adjusted, at least partially, to predictable changes in task conditions to improve reward rate, consistent with a rationally bounded implementation of normative principles. These findings help inform our understanding of the extent and limits of flexible decision formation in the brain.

Saccades made during memory maintenance prioritize memory for the saccade target, but it is unclear if this benefit is specific to a location or extends across memorized objects. In three experiments, we examined whether saccadic selection spreads to other locations within the same object. In Experiment 1, we asked observers to remember three oriented Gabors presented either within contour-defined objects or without object structure. A subsequent movement cue prompted observers to move their eyes to the indicated location. We then probed memory for stimuli at locations equidistant from the saccade target, in either the same or a different object. Memory was best for stimuli at locations congruent with the saccade target, and consistently weaker for other stimuli presented in the same or a different object than the saccade target. In Experiment 2, we created more complex objects by adding more object features to the stimulus. Again, memory performance was best for stimuli congruent with the saccade target location, whereas memory in incongruent trials was worse and similar for stimuli in the same and different object as the saccade target. In Experiment 3, we tested if saccadic selection is present and propagates within the object in a change detection task. Again, memory performance (i.e., change detection) was best at the saccade target location. However, this memory benefit also spread to other locations within the same object. Our results imply that saccadic selection in visual working memory is primarily space-based but can also spread towards locations within the object where a saccade was directed.

How do we make sense of something weve never seen before? Classifying objects into superordinate classes like animal is a key step in interpreting novel experiences, but is challenging because radically different items (e.g., octopus, rabbit) must somehow be grouped together. In general, no single feature is shared by all members. We reasoned that to classify or imagine novel items from outside the distribution of previous experiences, observers parse objects into meaningful component features that they can mentally recombine ( compositionality). To test this, we asked participants to draw familiar and novel members of nine superordinate object classes. We then asked other participants to classify the drawings, and mark and label their defining parts. We find that human classification performance is well predicted by a Bayesian classifier that optimally combines the part labels, suggesting humans can create and classify out-of-distribution experiences through a compositional generative representation of object features.